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Abstract. We develop Integer Programming (IP) solutions for some special college
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We focus on four special features, namely the solution concept of stable score-limits,
the presence of lower and common quotas, and paired applications. We note that each
of the latter three special feature makes the college admissions problem NP-hard to
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Introduction
Gale and Shapley [12] introduced and solved the college admissions problem, which gen-
erated a broad interdisciplinary research eld in mathematics, computer science, game
theory and economics1. The Hungarian higher education admission scheme is also based
on the Gale-Shapley algorithm, but it is extended with a number of heuristics since the
model contains some special features. In this paper we will study the possibility of mod-
elling these special features with integer programming techniques.
In the Hungarian higher education matching scheme (see a detailed description in [26]
and [5]), the students apply for programmes. However, for simplicity, we will refer to
the programmes as colleges in our models. The rst special feature of the application is
the presence of ties, and the solution concept of stable score-limits. When two applicants
have the same score at a programme then they should either both be accepted or rejected,
according to the Hungarian admission policy. The solution of stable score-limits ensures
that no quota is violated, since essentially the last group of students with the same score
that would cause a quota violation is always rejected. A set of stable score-limits always
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exists, and a student-optimal solution can be found eciently by an extension of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm, as shown in [7]. This method is the basis of the heuristic used in the
Hungarian application.
The second and third special features studied in this paper are the lower and common
quotas. A university may set not just an upper quota for the number of admissible students
for a programme, but also a lower quota. The violation of this lower quota would imply
the cancellation of the programme. Furthermore, a common upper quota may be also
introduced for a set of programmes, to limit the number of students admitted to a faculty,
at a university or nationwide with regard to the state-nanced seats in a particular subject.
These concepts were studied in [6], where the authors showed that each of these special
features makes the the college admission problem NP-hard, as present in the Hungarian
application. Finally, students can apply for pairs of programmes in case of teacher studies.
This possibility was reintroduced to the scheme in 2010. This problem is closely related to
the hospitals residents problem with couples, where couples may apply for pair of positions,
that is also known to be NP-hard [17].
The polytope of stable matchings was described in a number of papers for the stable
marriage problem [23], [21], and for the college admissions problem as well [4], [10] and
[24]. For these classical models, since the extremal point of the polytopes are integral, and
thus correspond to stable matchings, one could always use a linear programming solver to
compute stable solutions (although the computation of solutions can be done eciently
by the Gale-Shapley algorithm as well).
However, by introducing even just one special feature, the existence of a stable match-
ing may not be guaranteed any more, and the problem of nding a stable solution can be
even NP-hard. In such cases it can be worth to investigate integer programming techniques
for solving these problems in theory and in practice as well. To the best of our knowledge
there have been only two recent studies of this kind so far. In the rst study Kwanashie and
Manlove [15] investigated the problem of nding a maximum size weakly stable matchings
for college admissions problems with ties, a problem known to be NP-hard, and motivated
by the Scottish resident allocation scheme. In the other paper [9] the above mentioned
matching with couples problem has been studied. As we have already mentioned, one of
the four special features of the Hungarian higher education scheme, namely the presence
of paired applications, has a close connection to the problem of couples. However, the
remaining three special features studied in our paper, the stable score-limits, the lower
and common quotas have not been investigated from this aspect yet.
It is interesting to note that whilst we are not aware of any large scale application for
two-sided stable matching markets, except two minor examples2, integer programming is
the standard technique used for kidney exchange programs [1], [22] and [16].
Finally, we would like to highlight that the models and solution techniques presented
in this college admission context may well be useful for other applications too. Two
important examples could be controlled school choice [2], where the policy makers might
want to improve the social-ethnic diversity of the schools by setting dierent quotas for
some types of students. The other example is the resident allocation program, as used
in Japan [14], where both lower and upper quotas can be requested as regional caps to
ensure a better coverage in health care services in all geographic areas with regard to each
2In a famous study Roth [19] analysed the nature and the long term success of a dozen resident allocation
schemes established in the UK in the late seventies. He found that two schemes produced stable outcomes
and both of them remained in use. From the remaining six ones, that did not always produce stable
matchings, four were eventually abandoned. The two programs that were not always produced stable
solutions but yet remained used were based on linear programming techniques and has been operated for
the two smallest market. Unver [25] studied these programs and the possible reasons of their survival in
detail.
2
medical specialty.
In section 1 we describe a basic model for the classical College Admissions problem that
will be the basis of our extended models. In section 2 we consider the College Admissions
problem with ties and we describe two integer linear programs for nding a stable set of
score-limits. The rst model uses the objective function to achieve stability and thus lead
to the student-optimal stable set of score-limits. The second model describes all the stable
sets of score-limits by an extended IP model. In section 3 we formulate an IP for describing
the College Admissions problem with lower quotas, we provide some useful lemmas that
can speed up a solution, and we also extend the model for the case where the lower quotas
are established for sets of colleges. In section 4 we study the College Admissions problem
with common quotas and we give an integer programming model that describes the set of
stable solutions. In section 5 we briey describe the special feature of paired applications.
Finally, in section 6, we analyse the possibility and diculties of formulating general IP
models to describe the stable solutions when some combination of special features are
present in the application.
1 A model for the classical College Admissions problem
Our basic model is an extension of the Rothblum [23] model (analysed also in [21]). This
model has been described in [4].
Let A = fa1; : : : ang be the set of applicants and C = fc1; : : : ; cmg the set of colleges.
Let uj denote the upper quota of college cj . Regarding the preferences and priorities, let
rij denote the rank of college cj in ai's preference list, meaning that ai prefers cj to ck if
rij < rik. Let sij be an integer representing the score of ai at college cj , meaning that ai
has priority over ak at college cj if sij > skj , where s is the maximum possible score. We
denote the set of applications by E.
We introduce binary variables xij 2 f0; 1g for each application coming from ai to cj ,
as a characteristic function of the matching, where xij = 1 corresponds to the case when
ai is assigned to cj . The feasibility of a matching can be ensured with the following two
sets of constraints. X
j:(ai;cj)2E
xij  1 for each ai 2 A (1)
X
i:(ai;cj)2E
xij  uj for each cj 2 C (2)
Here, (1) implies that no applicant can be assigned to more than one college, and (2)
implies that the upper quotas of the colleges are respected.
One way to enforce the stability of a feasible matching is by the following constraint.0@ X
k:rikrij
xik
1A  uj + X
h:(ah;cj)2E;shj>sij
xhj  uj for each (ai; cj) 2 E (3)
Note that for each (ai; cj) 2 E, if ai is matched to cj or to a more preferred college
than the rst term provides the satisfaction of the inequality. Otherwise, when the rst
term is zero, then the second term is greater than or equal to the right hand side if and
only if the places at cj are lled with applicants with higher scores.
Remark 1: When we have ties in the priorities (due to equal scores), then the following
modied stability constraints, together with the feasibility constraints (1) and (2), lead
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to weakly stable matchings (in a model also known as Hospitals/Residents problem with
Ties). 0@ X
k:rikrij
xik
1A  uj + X
h:(ah;cj)2E;shjsij
xhj  uj for each (ai; cj) 2 E (4)
Note that weakly stable matchings can have dierent sizes and the problem of nding
a maximum size weakly stable matching is NP-hard. See more about this problem, and
its solutions by IP techniques in the recent paper of Kwanashie and Manlove [15].
Remark 2: In the absence of ties, we can get an applicant-optimal (resp. an applicant-
pessimal) stable solution by setting the objective function of the IP as the minimum (resp.
maximum) of the following term: X
(ai;cj)2E
rij  xij
We remind the reader that these extreme solutions can be obtained with the two ver-
sions of Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm in linear time [12].
Remark 3: Baou and Balinski [4] proposed an alternative model to describe the
stable admission polytope, since the above simple integer program may admit fractional
solutions as extreme point. See also Sethuraman et al. [24] about the alternative model.
Fleiner [10] provided a dierent description for the stable admission polytope.
2 Stable score-limits
The use of score-limits (or cuto scores) is very common in college admission systems.
The applicants have a score at each place to which they are applying and they are ranked
according to these scores by the colleges. The solution is announced in terms of score-
limits, each college (or a central coordinator) announces the score of the last admitted
student, and each student is then admitted to her most preferred place on her preference
list where she achieved the score-limit. See more about the Irish, Hungarian, Spanish and
Turkish applications in [7]. The score-limits can be seen as a kind of dual solution of a
matching, or prices in a competitive equilibrium. Azevedo and Leshno [3] analysed this
phenomenon in detail.
In this section rst we develop a basic model for the classical College Admissions
problem by using score-limits. Then we discuss the case when ties can appear due to
students applying to a place with the same score, as happens in Hungary. We show how
this extended setting can be described with a similar IP both with the use of an objective
function and without.
2.1 Stable score-limits with no ties
If we are given a stable matching for a College Admissions problem then we can dene a
stable set of score-limits by keeping the following requirements. Each student must meet
the score-limit of the college where she is admitted, and no student meets the score-limit of
a college that rejected her. These two requirements imply that every student is admitted
to the best place where she achieved the score-limit. Finally, to ensure that no student is
rejected if a quota was not lled we shall require the score-limit of each unlled college to
be minimal.
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To describe this solution concept with an integer program, we introduce new variables
for the score-limits. Let tj be the score-limit at college cj , where 0  tj  s + 1. The
feasibility constraints (1) and (2) remain the same, we only need to link the score-limits
to the matching and establish the new stability conditions as follows.
tj  (1  xij)  (s+ 1) + sij for each (ai; cj) 2 E (5)
and
sij + 1  tj +
0@ X
k:rikrij
xik
1A  (s+ 1) for each (ai; cj) 2 E (6)
Here, (5) implies that if an applicant is admitted to a college then she achieved the
score-limit of that college. The other constraint, (6), ensures that if applicant ai is not
admitted to cj then either her score at cj is lower than the score-limit, tj , or she is admitted
to a college that she preferred.
Finally, we need to ensure that each college that could not ll its quota has a minimal
score-limit. We introduce an indicator variable fj 2 f0; 1g for each college cj which is
equal to zero if the college is unlled, by using the following constraint.
fj  uj 
X
i:(ai;cj)2E
xij for each cj 2 C (7)
Then the following constraint ensures that if a college is unlled then its score-limit is
minimal.
tj  fj(s+ 1) for each cj 2 C (8)
We summarise the above statements in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 The stable matchings and the related stable sets of score-limits of a College
Admissions problem correspond to the solutions of the integer linear program consisting of
the feasibility conditions (1), (2), the stability conditions (5), (6) and conditions (7), (8).
Proof: A matching is feasible if and only if the corresponding solution satisfy the
feasibility constraints. Condition (5) implies that if an applicant is admitted to a college
then she achieved the score-limit of that college, and (6) implies that she has not achieved
the score-limit of any college that she prefers to her assignment. Therefore, these two
conditions are satised if and only if every applicant is admitted to the best place in her
list where she achieved the score-limit. Finally, (7) and (8) ensure that no college can have
positive score-limit, and therefore no college can reject any applicant, if its quota is not
lled.
2.2 Stable score-limits with ties
The problem with ties has been dened in [5] and studied in [7] and [11]. Ties can appear,
as the scores of the applicants might be equal at a college, and these ties are never broken in
the Hungarian application. Therefore a group of students with the same score are either
all accepted or all rejected. In the Hungarian application the upper quotas are always
satised, and the stability is dened with score-limits (cuto scores) as follows. For a set
of score-limits, each applicant is admitted to the rst place in her list where she achieves
the score-limit. A set of score-limits is feasible if no quota is violated. It is stable if no
score-limit can be lowered at any college without violating its quota, while keeping the
other score-limits unchanged. When no ties occur then this denition is equivalent to the
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original Gale-Shapley one. A stable set of score-limits always exists, since a generalised
Gale-Shapley algorithms can produce one. Moreover the applicant proposing version leads
to an applicant-optimal solution, where each of the score-limit at each college is as small
as possible, and a similar statement applies for the college proposing-version (see [5], [7]
and [11] for details).
Here we present an IP formulation to nd an applicant-optimal set of score-limits with
respect to the Hungarian version (where no upper quota may be violated) this is called H-
stable set of score-limits in [7]. The feasibility constraints (1) and (2) remain the same as
in the previous model, and also the two requirements regarding the score-limits, expressed
in constraints (5), (6). However, we cannot require the unlled colleges to have minimal
score-limits in this model, since an unlled seat might be created by a tie. We describe
two possible solutions for this problem. The rst is the use a simple objective function as
follows.
min
X
j=1:::m
tj (9)
The above objective function is necessary to ensure the stability condition, that is no
college can decrease its score limit without violating its quota, supposing that the other
score-limits remain the same. To summarise, we state and prove the correctness of the
integer program as follows.
Theorem 2 Feasibility conditions (1), (2) and stability conditions (5), (6) together with
the objective function (9) compose an integer linear program such that the optimal solution
of this IP corresponds to the applicant-optimal stable set of score-limits.
Proof: The feasibility constraints ensure that any binary solution of the IP corresponds
to a feasible matching, where each applicant is admitted to at most one college and no
quota is violated at any college. Conditions (5) and (6) ensure that each applicant is
admitted to the rst place in her preference list where she achieved the score-limit. In
particular, (5) implies that if ai is admitted to cj then she must have reached the score-
limit of cj , and (6) implies that if ai is not admitted to cj or any better college of her
preference (i.e. when the second term of the right hand side is zero) then ai could not
achieve the score-limit of cj . Finally, the objective function ensures that no college can
decrease its score-limit (without violating its quota). However, this objective function also
implies that the solution of the IP must correspond to the applicant-optimal stable set of
score-limits, since for any other stable set of score-limits at least one college would have a
higher score-limit and neither could have lower, so the sum of the score-limits would not
be minimal.
When we want to describe all sets of stable score-limits (and not only the applicant-
optimal one) then we have to replace the objective function with some additional con-
ditions. We can do that by introducing some new variables, as described in the next
subsection.
2.3 Stable score-limits with ties and free objective function
First, we introduce a binary variable yj for each college cj that is equal to one when tj is
positive (i.e. when there are some applicants rejected from cj), and otherwise it is zero.
tj  (s+ 1)yj for each cj 2 C (10)
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Then, for each application (ai; cj), we dene a new binary variable, dij , that can be
equal to one if ai desires cj compared to her actual match and ai would meet the admission
criteria at cj if the score-limit at cj was decreased by one, where m denotes the number
of colleges. X
rikrij
dik  (1  xij)m for each (ai; cj) 2 E (11)
tj   1  (1  dij)s+ sij for each (ai; cj) 2 E (12)
With the help of the new variables, we can now describe the stability condition of the
score-limits as follows.
(uj + 1)(1  yj) +
X
i:(ai;cj)2E
(xij + dij)  uj + 1 for each cj 2 C (13)
Theorem 3 Feasibility conditions (1), (2), stability conditions (5) and (6) and conditions
(10), (11), (12) for the new variables dij, together with a new stability condition (13)
compose an integer linear program such that each feasible integer solution corresponds to
a stable set of score-limits.
Proof: Again, the feasibility conditions ensure that the corresponding matching is
feasible, and vice versa. Similarly to the previous model, (5) implies that if an applicant is
admitted to a college then she achieved the score-limit of that college, and (6) implies that
each applicant is admitted to the best available place in her list, if admitted somewhere.
Now we shall prove that the remaining four sets of conditions are satised if and only if
the set of score-limits is stable, i.e. when no college can decrease its score-limit without
violating its quota. Suppose rst that we have a stable set of score-limits. We set all
variables in the IP model appropriately and we prove that the constraints are satised.
So let tj be the score-limit at college cj and we set yj to be one if tj is positive. Let dij be
equal to one for each applicant ai who would prefer to be matched to college cj compared
to her current partner and who would also meet the score-limit at cj if it was decreased
by one (i.e. sij = tj   1), and we set all the other dij variables to be zero. When doing so,
we satisfy conditions (11) and (12), since (11) is satised when no dik is equal to one if ai
prefers her current match cj to ck, and (12) is satised if ai meets the score-limit at cj if
it is decreased by one. The stability of the set of score-limits means that no college (with
a positive score-limit) can decrease its score-limit without violating its quota. This means
that if a college has a positive score-limit, so yj = 1, then if it decreased its score-limit
by one then the new students admitted were exactly those for whom the corresponding
variable dij is equal to one. The violation of the quota implies that (13) must be satised.
To prove the converse, let us suppose that have an assignment of values to the variables
in our IP model such that all the constraints in our IP model are satised. We shall prove
that the set of score-limits as dened by variables tj is stable, that is, for each college cj
either its score-limit is zero or the decrease of its score-limit would cause a quota violation.
When tj is positive then yj must be zero, so
P
i:(ai;cj)2E(xij + dij)  uj +1. Since dij can
be one only if ai both desire and deserves cj when tj is decreased to tj   1, this means
that the quota at cj would be indeed violated when the score-limit would be decreased by
one. (Note that yj does not necessarily have to be zero when tj is zero and dij does not
necessarily have to be one when ai both deserves and desires cj .)
Therefore now we can compute both the student-optimal and student-pessimal stable
score-limits, by setting the objective function as described in Remark 2. These extremal
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solutions can be also computed eciently by the two generalised versions of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm, as shown in [7].
We note that in [7] there was another stability denition, the so-called L-stability, that
is based on a more relaxed admission policy, namely when the last group of student with
the same score with whom the quota would be violated are always accepted. In this paper
we are focusing on the setting that is present in the Hungarian application, so we do not
deal with L-stability, but it would be possible to describe an IP model for that version as
well in a similar fashion.
3 Lower quotas
In this section we extend the classical College Admissions problem with the possibility of
having lower quotas set for the colleges. After developing an integer program for nding
a stable solution for this problem we describe the current heuristic used in Hungary and
we also provide some Lemmas that can speed up the solution of the IP. Finally we discuss
the possibility of having lower quotas for sets of colleges.
3.1 College Admissions problem with lower quotas
This problem has been dened in [6]. In addition to the College Admissions model, here
we have lower quotas as well. Let lj be the lower quota of college cj . In a feasible solution
a college can either be closed (in which case there is no student assigned to there), or
open, when the number of students admitted must be between its lower and upper quotas.
To describe this feasibility requirement, besides keeping (1), we modify (2) as follows. We
introduce a new binary variable, oj 2 f0; 1g for each college cj , where oj = 1 corresponds
to the case when the college is open.
oj  lj 
X
i:(ai;cj)2E
xij  oj  uj for each cj 2 C (14)
The above set of constraints together with (1) ensure the feasibility of the matching.
The stability of a solution requires the lack of traditional blocking pairs for open
colleges, and the lack of blocking groups for closed colleges. The latter means that there
cannot be at least as many unsatised students (unassigned or assigned to a less preferred
place) at a college as the lower quota of that college. The stability conditions can be
enforced with the following conditions.0@ X
k:rikrij
xik
1A  uj + X
h:(ah;cj)2E;shj>sij
xhj  oj  uj for each (ai; cj) 2 E (15)
X
i:(ai;cj)2E
241  X
k:rik<rij
xik
35  (1  oj)  (lj   1) + oj  n for each cj 2 C (16)
The rst condition implies the usual stability for open colleges, whilst the second
condition implies the group-stability for closed colleges. Below we give a formal denition
for the College Admission problem with lower quota and a proof of the above description
in the following Theorem.
Theorem 4 The feasibility conditions (1) and (14) together with the stability conditions
(15) and (16) form an integer program such that its solutions correspond to the stable
matchings of a college admissions problem with lower quotas.
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Proof: A solution of the IP satises the feasibility conditions (1) and (14) if and only
if the corresponding matching is feasible, i.e., no student is admitted to more than one
college and the lower and upper quotas are respected in each open college. Regarding
stability, condition (15) is redundant if the college is closed and implies the pairwise
stability condition for any open college. Condition (16) is redundant for open colleges,
and enforces group-stability for any closed college. To show the latter we shall see that the
right hand side of the constraint is lj   1 for a closed college cj and on the left hand side
those applicants of cj are counted who are not admitted to any preferred place according
to their preferences, so these are the students who would be happy if cj would be open
and admit them.
3.2 Heuristics
The problem of nding a stable matching for the college admissions problem with lower
quotas is proved to be NP-hard [6]. In the Hungarian application, where lower quotas
can be set for any programme, the following heuristic is used with regard to this special
feature. First, the applicant-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm produces a stable matching
where some lower quotas might be violated. The heuristic closes one programme, where
the ratio of the number of students admitted and lower quota is minimal, and then the
applicant-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm continues by letting the rejected students
(whose assigned programme has just been cancelled) apply to their next choices. This
heuristic runs in linear time in the number of applications, and it produces the applicant-
optimal stable matching for the remaining open colleges. However, as it was illustrated in
[6], this heuristic can easily produce unstable outcomes even when the problem is solvable.
With the IP technique, however, there is a good chance to nd a stable solution, whenever
it exists. The following lemmas can help in speeding up the solver.
Lemma 5 Let I be in instance of College Admission problem and I 0 be a reduced market
where a college is missing. Then the number of students admitted to any college in I 0 must
be at least as many as the number of students admitted in I. Moreover, when we compare
the student-optimal (resp. college optimal) stable matchings in I and I 0 then each student
gets admitted to a college at least as good in I then in I 0.
Proof: By the Rural Hospitals theorem ([13], [18] and [20]) we know that in the
College Admissions problem each college admits the same number of students in every
stable matching. Suppose rst that we consider the student-optimal stable matching in I.
When we remove a college then we can invoke the proposal-rejection sequence used in the
Gale-Shapley student proposing algorithm and obtain a new stable matching where each
college admits at least as many students as before and each student is admitted to the
same or a worse place (or nowhere). Suppose now that we consider the college optimal
stable matching for I 0. When we add back the missing college and restart the college-
proposing Gale-Shapley process then we will obtain a new stable solution that is at least
as good for each student as the previous one.
Lemma 6 The colleges that reach their lower quotas in the stable solutions of a College
Admissions problem with no lower quotas must be open in every stable solution where lower
quotas are respected.
Proof: Suppose now for a contradiction that a college cj that reaches its lower quota
for the original problem where all the colleges are open, denoted by I, but there is a stable
solution where cj is closed. Let X denote the set of closed colleges in this solution, where
cj 2 X, and let us denote the submarket where colleges in X are closed by IX . For the
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market where every college in X but cj is closed, denoted by IXnj , cj must still reach its
lower quota by Lemma 5. Furthermore, when we consider the applicant-optimal stable
matching for IXnj , when we remove cj and conduct the applicant proposing deferral-
acceptance process of Gale-Shapley, as in the Hungarian application, in the resulting
stable matching for IX the students who were previously matched to cj are all worse o.
Therefore for any pairwise stable matching in IX these students would block the matching
with college cj , since thew all prefer cj to their current match and they are at least as
many as the lower quota of cj .
Lemma 7 Suppose that X is the set of colleges that do not reach their lower quotas in
the stable solutions with no lower quotas. Given a college cj of X, if all the colleges in X
but cj are closed and cj still does not achieve its lower quota then cj must be closed in any
stable solution with lower quotas.
Proof: As we have seen in Lemma 6, no college outside X may be closed in any stable
solution, therefore for any stable solution a subset of X should be closed. Suppose for a
contradiction that we have a stable matching with lower quotas where Y  X is the set of
closed colleges and cj =2 Y , meaning that cj also reaches its lower quota in this matching.
Let Y 0 = X n cj , our assumption is that cj does not reach its lower quota in the stable
matchings when the colleges in Y 0 are closed. Since Y  Y 0, Lemma implies that cj has
at least as many students admitted in the stable matchings for IY (the market when the
colleges in Y are closed) than for IY 0 , a contradiction.
With the help of lemmas 6 and 7 we can iteratively nd some colleges which must
be open and perhaps also some that must be closed in any stable solution, thus reduce
the number of variants of our model, as follows. First we run the Gale-Shapley algorithm
without lower quotas, and then we set each college that reached its lower quota to be
open. Let us denote this set of colleges by X1. In the second step we check each college
in C nX1 whether it can be open in any stable solution, as described in Lemma 7. That
is, for each cj 2 C nX1 we close all the colleges C n (X1 [ cj), run the Gale-Shapley and
check whether cj reaches its lower quota. If not then we set cj to be closed. Let Y1 denote
the set of colleges that were found to be necessary to close in the second step. If Y1 is
nonempty then we repeat the rst step, we run again the Gale-Shapley algorithm with no
lower quotas and without colleges Y1. If, in addition to X1, some new colleges also achieve
their lower quotas in the reduced market then we add them to X1 and get a larger set of
colleges, X2, that must be open in every stable solutions. In case X2 is larger than X1
then we shall repeat the second step of our process with respect to X2. Again, if we nd
any new college that must be closed then we increase the set Y1 to Y2. We repeat this
process until Xt = Xt+1 or Yt = Yt+1 for any t, and then we stop.
3.3 Lower quotas for sets of colleges
We shall note that in the Hungarian application the lower quotas are set for pairs of pro-
grammes (actually for the same programme, just with separate quotas for state-nanced
and privately nanced students). If the lower quota for a set of colleges is not met then all
the colleges should be closed. This motivates the extended model where the lower quotas
can be applied for sets of colleges. In this case we need only to introduce a new binary
variable op for each set of colleges Cp with common lower quota lp that we associate with
the other indicator variables of individual colleges as follows.
op  np 
X
j:cj2Cp
oj  op  np for each Cp (17)
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where np is the number of colleges in Cp. We shall then set the feasibility conditions
(14) for the sets of colleges with common lower quotas as follows.
op  lp 
X
i:(ai;cj)2E
xij for each cj 2 C (18)
To dene stability in this setting is not easy though. In section 6 we discuss some
complications and potential solutions, basically by suggesting to drop the group-stability
criteria in the extended models, like this.
4 Common quotas
This problem has also been dened in [6]. For each set of colleges Cp  C the coordinator of
the scheme may set a common upper quota, up, meaning that the total number of students
admitted to colleges in Cp cannot exceed this quota. Therefore, the set of feasibility
constraints, (1) and (2), has to be extended with some new constraints enforcing the
common quotas, as follows. X
(ai;cj)2E;cj2Cp
xij  up for each Cp  C (19)
Regarding stability, rst of all we have to suppose that any two colleges, cj and ck, that
belong to a set of colleges Cp with a common quota must rank their applicants in the same
way. In particular, in the Hungarian application any student ai has the same score at such
colleges (i.e. programmes in Hungary) with common quota, so sij = sik holds. (In a more
general model, we should suppose to have a specic scoring for each set of colleges with
common quota, which is in agreement with the individual scorings of the colleges belonging
to this set. For instance, we could have a score spij for each application associated to a set
of colleges Cp with a common quota such that sij > slj implies s
p
ij > s
p
lj).
In this setting stability means that if a student ai is not admitted to a college cj
or to any better college of her preference then either cj must have lled its quota with
better students or there is a set of colleges Cp, such that cj 2 Cp and all the up places in
Cp have been lled with better students than ai. Biro et al. [6] showed that if the sets
of colleges with common upper quotas is nested, i.e., when Cp \ Cq 6= ; implies either
Cp  Cq or Cp  Cq, then a stable matching always exists, one can be found eciently
by the generalised Gale-Shapley algorithm and there are applicant and college optimal
solutions. However, if the set system is not nested then stable solution may not exist
and the problem of nding a stable matching is NP-hard. Interestingly the Hungarian
application involved nested set systems until 2007 when a legislative change modied the
structure of the underlying model and made the set system non-nested, with the possibility
of having no stable solution and also making the problem computationally hard.
Here, we show that we can express this stability condition with the use of score-limits,
in a similar fashion to the method we described in section 2. However, here we need to
assume that there are no ties. We set a score-limit tp for each set of colleges Cp with
common quota, which is less than or equal to the score of the weakest admitted student
if the common quota is lled, and 0 if the common quota is unlled in the matching.
When describing the model in this way, stability implies that if a student ai is admitted
to college cj then sij  tj and also sij  tp for any set of colleges Cp with common quota
where Cp includes cj . Furthermore, if ai is not admitted to cj or to any better college
of her preference then it must be the case that either sij < tj or sij < tp for some set of
colleges Cp with common quota where Cp contains cj . These conditions can be formalised
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with the following set of conditions, where qj denotes the number of sets of colleges with
common quota involving college cj , fcjg also being one of them.
tp  (1  xij)  (s+ 1) + sij for each (ai; cj) 2 E and cj 2 Cp (20)
and
sij + 1  tp +
0@ X
k:rikrij
xik + y
p
i
1A  (s+ 1) for each (ai; cj) 2 E and cj 2 Cp (21)
with X
p:cj2Cp
ypi  qj   1 for each (ai; cj) 2 E (22)
where ypi 2 f0; 1g is a binary variable. These conditions are needed to establish the
links between a matching and the corresponding score-limits. However, for stability we
also have to ensure that the score-limits are minimal. In case of strict preferences (i.e.,
when no two students have the same score at colleges belonging to a set of colleges with
a common quota), we can ensure the minimality of the score-limits with the following
conditions.
Again, we introduce an indicator variable fp for each set of colleges Cp which is equal
to zero if the common quota of these colleges is unlled, by using the following constraints.
fp  up 
X
i:(ai;cj)2E;cj2Cp
xij for each Cp  C (23)
Then we ensure that if a college or a set of colleges with a common quota is unlled
then its score-limit is zero.
tp  fp(s+ 1) for each Cp  C (24)
We describe and prove the correctness of the IP model in the following Theorem.
Theorem 8 Feasibility conditions (1), (2) and (19), with the stability conditions (20),
(21) and (22), together with (23) and (24) describe an integer program such that its so-
lutions correspond to stable matching for the College Admissions problem with common
quotas.
Proof: To see the correctness, we have to note rst that the matching is feasible if and
only if the feasibility constraints (1), (2) and (19) are satised, and conditions (23) and
(24) are satised if and only if the score-limit of any unlled college or set of colleges is
zero.
Now, suppose rst that we have a stable solution and we show that all the stability
conditions can be satised by setting the variables appropriately. When a common quota
Cp is lled we set tp to be equal to the last admitted applicant at any college included in
Cp. This ensures that the rst set of conditions (20) is satised. Let y
p
i = 0 if ai does
not meet tp at any college cj 2 Cp where she applied to, and ypi = 1 otherwise, with the
exception of set fcjg, where we set yji = 0 if i is admitted to cj or to a better place.
The stability of the matching then implies (22). Finally, let us consider an application
(ai; cj) where cj 2 Cp. If ai is admitted to cj or to a better college then the corresponding
constraint (21) is satised, irrespective of the value ypi . Otherwise, suppose that ai is not
admitted to cj or to any better place. If ai does not meet the score-limit tp then (21) is
satised, obviously, and it is also satised when she meets tp, since y
p
i = 1 in that case.
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Regarding the other direction, suppose that we have a solution for the IP model, and
we will show that this ensures the stability of the corresponding matching. If (ai; cj) is
in the matching then constraints (20) imply that ai achieves the score-limit of cj and also
the score-limit of every set of colleges with common quota containing cj . Finally, suppose
that ai is not admitted to cj or to any better college of her preference. Since one of the
additional variables of form yli must be zero, say y
p
i , the corresponding constraint (21)
implies that the set of colleges Cp containing cj has a score-limit tp greater than sij . So
the matching is indeed stable.
Finally we note that if we have ties then we shall use an objective function that
minimises the sum of the score-limits or an extended model, similar to the ones described
in section 2.
5 Paired applications
In the Hungarian application students can apply for pairs of programmes in case of teach-
ers' studies, e.g. when they want to become a teacher in both maths and physics. In this
setting of a College Admission problem with paired applications stability means that if a
student is not admitted to a pair of colleges, or to any better college (or pair of colleges)
in her list then either of these colleges must have lled its quota with better applicants.
In terms of score-limits, either of these colleges must have a score-limit that this student
has not achieved.
This problem is similar to the well-known Hospitals/Residents problem with Couples,
where residents apply to pairs of positions (see a survey [8]). However, there are some slight
dierences. Here a student may have both simple and paired applications in her list, thus
she can behave both as a single applicant and as a couple at the same time. A paired appli-
cation in the college admission problem involves two distinct programmes, whilst a couple
may apply for a pair of positions at the same hospital in a resident allocation program. So
neither of these problems is more general than the other. Nevertheless both problems are
NP-hard, since the NP-hardness proof of Ronn [17] for the Hospitals/Residents problem
with couples was concerned with a special case where each hospital has one place only,
and this is also a special case of the College Admissions problem with paired applications.
Note that the case of paired applications can be modeled in a similar way as in the
case of common quotas. Each pair of colleges can be seen as an articial college, and the
upper quotas of the original colleges will become common quotas.
For completeness, we describe the IP model for college admissions with paired appli-
cation. We introduce new, articial colleges CP , that are pairs of compatible colleges. Let
cjk 2 CP be one compatible pair of colleges, the indicator variable of an application from
student ai to this pair of colleges is denoted by xi(jk), and the rank of this application in
ai's list is denoted by ri(jk). For a more convenient notation, let e 2 ES denote a simple
application, and e 2 EP denote a paired application, where the set of all applications is
E = ES [ EP . With a slight abuse of notation, let ai 2 e mean that application e is
coming from applicant ai, and cj 2 e or c(jk) 2 e mean that the application is going to
college cj or pair of colleges c(jk), respectively.
The feasibility constraints can now be modied in the following way.X
e:ai2e2E
xe  1 for each ai 2 A (25)
X
e:cj2e2ES
xe +
X
k=1:::m
X
e:c(jk)2e2EP
xe  uj for each cj 2 C (26)
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The stability conditions are expressed with score-limits. There is no change for simple
applications.
tj  (1  xij)  (s+ 1) + sij for each (ai; cj) 2 ES (27)
and
sij + 1  tj +
0@ X
e:ai2e;rerij
xe
1A  (s+ 1) for each (ai; cj) 2 ES (28)
For paired applications, the following conditions should hold.
tj 
 
1  xi(jk)
  (s+ 1) + sij for each (ai; c(jk)) 2 EP (29)
tk 
 
1  xi(jk)
  (s+ 1) + sik for each (ai; c(jk)) 2 EP (30)
and
sij + 1  tj +
0@ X
e:ai2e;reri(jk)
xe + y
(jk)
i
1A  (s+ 1) for each (ai; c(jk)) 2 EP (31)
sij + 1  tk +
0@ X
e:ai2e;reri(jk)
xe + (1  y(jk)i )
1A  (s+ 1) for each (ai; c(jk)) 2 EP (32)
Here, the rst two conditions, (29) and (30), ensure that the score limit is met for
each of the colleges where an applicant is admitted with a paired application. The second
two conditions, (31) and (32), imply that if a student ai is not admitted to a pair of
colleges c(jk) or to any better place(s) then it must be the case that she did not achieve
the score-limit at one of these colleges. Here again, y
(jk)
i 2 f0; 1g is a binary variable.
Finally, similarly to conditions (23) and (24), we have to ensure that only the lled
colleges can have positive score-limits.
fj  uj 
X
e:cj2e2ES
xe +
X
k=1:::m
X
e:c(jk)2e2EP
xe for each cj 2 C (33)
Then we ensure that if a college or a set of colleges with a common quota is unlled
then its score-limit is zero.
tj  fj(s+ 1) for each cj 2 C (34)
Theorem 9 The College Admissions problem with paired applications can be described
with the solutions of the IP consisting of conditions (25) to (34).
Proof: Conditions (25) and (26) are satised if and only if the corresponding matching
is feasible. Regarding the stability constraints, if we consider a single application then (27)
ensures that the applicant has reached the score-limit of the college where she has been
admitted, and (28) implies that a rejection must have taken place because the applicant
has not reached the score-limit of that college. Similarly, for a paired application (29) and
(30) are satised if and only if the applicant has achieved the score-limits of both colleges
where she has been admitted in a paired application. Conditions (31) and (32) ensure
that if a paired application is rejected, it must be the case that the applicant has not
reached the score-limit of either of the colleges in her paired application. To summarise,
each applicant is admitted to the best college or pair of colleges on her list where she
has achieved the score-limit(s). Finally, conditions (33) and (34) imply that only those
colleges which are lled may reject applications.
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6 Combining the models into a single IP
In the four previous sections we have developed IP models to deal with each of the four
special features which are present in the Hungarian application. However, all of these spe-
cial features are present in the application simultaneously, and so to provide a solution for
real data we need to create a combined model which incorporates all of the constraints.
However, this task is not easy, since not only the constraints have to be adjusted, but
sometimes the stability denitions may also contradict each other. Since paired applica-
tions can be seen as a special case of common quotas, as we described in the previous
section, we focus on the dierent combinations of ties, lower and common quotas.
6.1 Stable score-limits with ties and lower quotas
The feasibility of the matching is characterised by constraints (1) and (14). For stability,
we shall use (5) to ensure that a student is only admitted if she achieved the score-limit.
We need (16) again for group-stability. Here we need a combination of (6) and (15) to
enforce stability for open colleges, as follows.
sij + 1  tj +
0@ X
k:rikrij
xik + 1  oj
1A  (s+ 1) for each (ai; cj) 2 E (35)
Finally, either we need to minimise the sum of score-limits with the objective function
or to use conditions (10), (11), (12) and (13) to ensure that the decrease of any positive
score-limit in the solution would cause the violation of a quota.
6.2 Stable score-limits with ties and common quotas
As we have mentioned in section 4, our IP model for common quotas are based on score-
limits, so it is not too dicult to reconcile these two features. The issue that we must
resolve is that we cannot require the unlled colleges or sets of colleges to have zero score-
limit here, as this might have resulted from the rejection of a group of applicants with the
same score. So instead of using (23) and (24), either we have to minimise the sum of the
score-limits with the objective function to enforce stability, or we shall develop a model
similar to the one described in subsection 2.3 for sets of colleges with common quotas.
6.3 The diculty in reconciling lower and common quotas
The feasibility of the matching is now characterised by constraints (1), (14) and (19). For
stability, we need (20) to ensure that a student is only admitted if she achieved the score-
limit of the college assigned and also the score-limit for each set of colleges with a common
quota that contains this college. For open colleges, the pairwise stability condition can be
enforced with the following modication of (21):
sij+1  tp+
0@ X
k:rikrij
xik + y
p
i + 1  oj
1A  (s+1) for each (ai; cj) 2 E and cj 2 Cp (36)
together with (22).
However, dening group-stability is problematic here. Since even if there is a closed
college with more unsatised students than its lower quota the admission of these students
could lead to the violation of a common upper quota. In which case this block should not
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be allowed. So combining the constraints for lower and common quotas is challenging.
Therefore one might consider the possibility of abandoning the group-stability constraints
related to lower quotas. However, in this case, a possible solution would be to close all the
colleges. This unsatisfactory scenario could be avoided by setting the objective function
such that the number of students admitted becomes the rst priority and the minimisation
of the total score limits is the second priority.
6.4 Stable score-limits with ties, lower and common quotas
As we have described, the concept of stable stable score-limits for College Admissions
problem with ties can be reconciled with both lower and common quotas, however the latter
two are dicult to combine. Therefore in the practical application the organisers should
decide what stability conditions they want to satisfy in the rst place. One possibility is to
drop the group-stability conditions with regard to lower quotas and to use an appropriate
objective function to ensure that the solution is not biased. In order to set the right
conditions one should do simulations with the real data to see how the model, and the
objective function in particular, may inuence the resulting solution.
Further notes
As we described in the previous section, the combination of the four special features result
in interesting challenges in two ways. First, we need to dene appropriate stability criteria
when both lower and upper quotas are present. Second, we need to combine the separate
integer programmes into a single one that would result in a suitable solution for the real
application.
It would be also important to know whether these IP formulations may be solved within
a realistic timescale for such a large scale application as the Hungarian higher education
matching schemes, with around 100000 applicants. Our plan is to conduct experiments
on real data we have access to, which comes from the 2008 match run of the Hungarian
higher education scheme.
Furthermore, one could always try to solve our special college admissions problems
with other approaches, e.g. with dierent integer programmes. Finally, our models may
be useful in other applications as well, such as controlled school choice (see e.g. [2]) and
resident allocation with distributional constraints (see e.g. [14]).
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